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Comparable Worth in the Public Sector
ABSTRACT
Proponentsofcomparable worth assert that within a firm jobs can be
valuedin terms of the skill, effort and responsibility they require, as
well as the working conditions they offer, and that jobs that are of comparable
worth to the firm should receive equal compensation. After documenting the
majorpush that has occurred for comparable worth inthe state and local
sector, Section II of our paper discusses the casefor and against
comparableworth from the perspective of analystica]. economists.
The reminder of the paper is empirical in nature and focuses on
issuesthat arise when one attempts to implement comparable worth.Section
IIIaddresses attempts by various states to infer ifcomparableworth "wage
gaps" exist fromjobevaluation studies they have conducted andtests how
sensitive their results are to the statistical methods used to infer discri-
mination. Section I'! estimates whether male/female comparable worth wage
gaps nay partially be compensating differentials for differences in oppor-
tunity for occupational nobility. Finally Section V presents estimates of
systems of demand curves for state and local government employees and tests
whether within occupational groups male/female substitution occurs as
male/female wage rates change and whether substitution occurs across occupa-
tions as occupational wages change. These estimates are then used to simu-
late what the likelyeffectof a comparable worth wage policy would be on







Some two decades after the passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which together prohibit (among
other things) sex discrimination in wages on any given job and sex discrim-
ination in access to employment opportunities, it is still common to
observe that on average females earn less than males, females are distri-
buted across occupations in a quite different manner than males, and
earnings in occupations that are dominated by females tend to be lower than
earnings in those dominated by males, even after one controls for tradi-
tional proxies for productivity.' The frustrations generated by these
outcomes have led to pressure for the adoption of the principle of
able worth, a principle that at least one participant in the debate has
called "the women's issue of the 1980s.h'2
Put in simplest terms, proponents of comparable worth assert thiit jobs
within a firm can be valued in terms of the skill, effort, and responai—
bility they require, as well as the working conditions they offer. Two
jobs would be said to be of comparable worth to a firm if they were
comparable in terms of these characteristics. the principle of comparable
worth asserts that within a firm, jobs that are of comparable worth to the
fin, should receive equal compensation.
Whilesome efforts to implement comparable worth have taketi place in
the private sector, the major push for comparable worth has occurred in the
state and local government sector.3 By the mid 1960s over a dozen states
hadpassedcomparable worth legislation covering state employees (Table I),
althoughthese laws were rarelyenforced.Starting with a 1974Stateof2
Washington study, a number of states have undertaken formal job evaluation
studies to see how their compensation systems mesh with the principle of
comparable worth (Table 1). In several cases, this has led to "voluntary"
implementation of comparable worth through the legislative and collective
bargaining processes (e.g., Minnesota), or to court ordered implementation
(Washington).5 Table 1 summarizes the status of comparable worth initia-
tives in the fifty states and the District of Columbia, as of the summer of
1984. It is worth noting that by this date nine states had begun the
process of implementing some form of comparable worth in their employees'
compensation systems.
Comparable worth initiatives have also been undertaken at the local
level. Table 2 presents data on 45 cities, counties and school districts
that had either undertaken a study of the issue, had at least one group of
employees in litigation over the issue, had passed a local ordinance, or
were contemplating implementing or had implemented comparable worth wage
adjustments by the summer of 1984. Many of these units were in the states
of California, Minnesota and Washington. Comparable worth wage adjustments
were implemented in San Jose, California after a well—publicized strike of
municipal employees and this undoubtedly influenced the spread to other
California units. }tinnesota passed a law in April 1984 requiring political
subdivisions to do job evaluations and then to revise theircompensation
structure in accord with comparable worth. Finally, the early Washington
comparable warth study mentioned above attracted attention to the issue in
that state.3
Given the growing importance of the concept of comparable worth in the
public sector,6 a theoretical and empirical analysis of some of the issues
it raises is obviously in order. We begin in the next section with a
discussion of the cases for and against comparable worth, from the per-
spective of analytical labor economists. These are discussed in the
context of simple labor market models and we stress the key assumptions
that influence whether the policy might be considered desirable. Ulti-
mately we conclude that the debate over comparable worth must involve a
consideration of the trade—off between efficiency and equity.
The next two sections ignore the objections to the principle of
comparable worth and, assuming one wants to implement it, discuss some of
the conceptual and operational problems involved. Previous studies,
primarily by noneconomists, have addressed many of the problems in this
area (e.g., the existence of sex bias in describing or evaluating jobs, the
difficulty of devising evaluation schemes, and the problem of rater
reliability) so our discussion on these issues will be brief. Rather, our
focus will be on two issues.
First, in Section III we address the attempts by various states to
conduct comparable worth job evaluation studies in which wages are related
to total job evaluation points and then discrimination inferred if, on
average, female—dominated occupations receive lower wages than male—
dominated occupations with comparable total evaluation points. We ask if
it is reasonable to simply sum up points over the different job evaluation
factors (e.g., training, job responsibility, working conditions) to get a
total score for each job which wages are then related to——for this assumes4
employers "value' an additional point of each factor equally. Using a
hedonic wage equation approach, we use data from job evaluation studies
conducted in the states of Minnesota, Washington and Connecticut to
estimate empirically if the weights these states actually assign to each
factor are equal and, if not, hDv this affects estimates of male/female
"comparable worth gaps. We also test in this section whether functional
form assumptions affect these estimates.
Total compensation on a job includes opportunities for occupational
mobility and subsequent wage growth. The above—mentioned state studies
ignore this, implicitly assuming that male/female current wage differen-
tials for given job evaluation point scores are not compensated for by
opportunities for wage growth. To test if this assumption is true would
require longitudinal earnings data for.male and female public employees
whose initial job evaluation scores are equal. While such data are
unavailable, Section IV uses data on state and local government employees
in New York State from the 1/100 sample of the 1970 Census of Population to
illustrate how one might indirectly test this assumption. These data
permit us to identify individuals' industry and occupation of employment in
both 1965 and 1970, as well as their 1969 earnings levels. Mean earnings
by 3—digit public sector occupation in New York State are constructed from
these data and used to obtained estimates of male/female public sector
differentials in occupational mobility in the state.
Section V switches to a different issue; some of the unanticipated (by
proponents) side effects of implementing comparable worth in the public
sector. Comparable worth wage adjustments (henceforth CWWA) would likely5
alter at least four types of relative prices that public employers face.
First, for any given function (e.g., police) and within any major occupa-
tional group (e.g., clerical) the average wage of female employees would
rise relative to the average wage of male employees, as some female
employees received CWWA. Second, across major occupational groups, the
average wage of employees in heavily "female" occupations (e.g., clerical)
would rise relative to the average wages of employees in heavily "male"
(e.g., crafts) occupations, as more employees in the former would receive
C1JWA. Third, across functions, the average wage in heavily female domi-
nated functions (e.g., elementary education) would rise relative to the
average wage in heavily male dominated functions (e.g., firefighters), as
employees in the former would again be more likely to receive CWWA.
Finally, holding constant the existing distribution of public employees,
the average wage of public employees would rise relative to the prices of
other goods and services.
It is natural to ask how such relative wage changes would affect the
composition of public employment. To the extent that public employers'
employment decisions are sensitive to their employees' wage rates, one
would expect to observe the four sets of relative wage changes leading
respectJvely to the substitution of some male for some female employees
within a function—occupation group, the substitution of some employment in
male dominated occupations for some employment in female dominated occupa-
tions (within a function), the substitution of some employment in male
dominated functions for some employment in female dominated functions, and
a decline in the aggregate level of public employment. For all these6
reasons, CWWA might be expected to lead to a decline in female employment.
Section V provides estimates of the extent to which some of those
typesof adjustments might occur in the state and local sector. Existing
estimatesof the demand for labor in the public sector are supplemented by
new estimates of the determinants of male/female and occupational employ-
ment ratios, obtained from 1910 and 1980 Censuses of Population data.
Based upon these estimates, a crude simulation of the potential effects of
CWWA on female employment in the publicsectoris presented. Finally,
SectionVI summarizes our findings andpresentssome brief concluding
remarks.
-
II.The Cases For and Against Comparable Worth7
Consider the simplest possible stylized competitive labor market
model. In a competitive labor market a firm hires employees in an occupa-
tion or job category until the category's marginal product equals its real
wage. A category's marginal product represents its "worth' to an employer.
However, this is not necessarily fixed over time, but rather depends upon
the number of employees hired in the category and all other job categories,
the quantity of capital available to employees to work with, the production
technology, and the quality of employees in the various job categories.
The worth of a job then can not be determined independent of the qualifica-
tions of its incumbents and may well change over time. This suggests that
job evaluation surveys cannot be a one—shot event, but rather must be
constantly updated; the wbrth of a job to an employer is not necessarily
constant over time.87
Nowmove to the level of the labor market as a whole. The aggregation
of individual firm's demand curves foreachoccupation leads to market
demand curves for the occupation. The supply of labor to each occupa-
tion/job category will depend upon workers' qualifications, the pecuniary
and nonpecuniary forms of compensation every job offers and the distribu-
tion of preferences across workers for the various jobs. If there are no
barriers to occupational mobility, a worker will move between jobs until
the "net advantage" he or she perceives from each is equalized. Such
movements load to an equilibrating structure of occupational wage differen-
tials; this depends upon the distribution of workers' qualifications and
"tastes" for the various jobs.
In this stylized competitive world, all of the factors that comparable
,,orth advocates believe should affect wages (skill, effort, responsibility,
and working conditions) would affect wages, since these factors would
influence the underlying demand and supply schedules. However, the weight
the market woul4 place on each factor in determining wageswouldreflect
the entire distribution of employeest tastes for, and employers' valuation
of, each factor, not the weight assigned by a job evaluation scheme.
If in such a world females clustered into lower—paying occupations
than males who had comparable productivity related characteristics (e.g.,
education), this would reflect only systematic differences in tastes
between males and females for the nonpecuniary characteristics offered by
the various jobs. For example, married females with children might have
strongpreferencesfor jobs that do notrequire travel, long hours, or work
thatmust bebrought honein the evenings. Given their preferences,males8
and females would have made optimal career choices and no government
intervention would be required.
Of course, this conclusion presupposes the validity of the assumptions
ofthemodel and there are a number that proponents of comparable worth
seriously challenge. The first is the assumption that there are no
barriers to occupational mobility. If women are systematically excluded
from high paying occupations, one cannot claim that the structure of
earnings is the result of voluntary choice. A market economist would re-
spond that an appropriate long—run remedy in this case would be to break
down occupational barriers through actions including rigorous enforcement
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, However, such actions would provide
only for gradual improvement of the welfare of the discriminated against
group, as they would have to wait for vacancies to occur in the higher
paying male jobs. In addition, for jobs that require training, this policy
would benefit primarily new entrants whose tine horizons are sufficiently
long to enable then to profitably undertake the necessary training.
In the absence of a policy that could I) create tI1et!jobsfor all
qualified females who want them, 2) identify the older women who historic
discrimination prevented from making different occupational choices early
in their lives and who now could not afford to profitably undertake the
necessary investment if the barriers to entry were bràken, and 3) would
provide resources to these women now so that they could undertake the
training, it could be argued that a policy calling for comparable worth
might make sense. Its justification would be based on equity considera-
tions; one would have to conclude that these would outweigh any efficiency9
losses that might result. The latter include any decreased female employ-
ment caused by the increased wages in these female occupations (see Section
V).9
The second assumption challenged is that wages in female dominated
occupations are determined in competitive markets. There is considerable
evidence that employers in some female dominated occupations, such as
public school teachers and hospital nurses, appear to have monopsrny
power.'° As iswell—known,inthiscircumstance there is a range over
whichone can "legislate" a higher wage without suffering any employment
loss. Whether the wage that would be set under a comparable worth wage
policy would fall in such a range cannot be determined a priori and, in any
case,the vast majority offemales are not employed in these occupations.
Aremedy that insures that employers in these markets actively compete for
workers might make more sense than comparable worth."
The case for comparable worth thus seems to rest on the argument that
the current occupational distribution of female employees is based on
discriminatory barriers which existing legislation has not broken down.
Even if one could enforce these laws, breaking down barriers does not help
experienced older workers who have invested heavily in occupation—specific
training and whose time horizon is now too short to profitably undertake
new occupational investments, Comparable worth is one of several policies
that epuld provide a remedy for these workers.12Whether it is a desir-
able policy depends upon one's perceptions of how the benefits it provides
contrast with the efficiency losses it induces. Just as with one's
perception about the value of the minimum wage, given the trade—of fs10
involved, ultimately one's position on comparable worth must depend on
value judgments.
111.Comparable Worth Job Evaluation Studies
Suppøse one ignores the objections to comparable worth posed by
economists and decides that a governmental unit's compensation structure
should be determined solely by this principle. The first task one would
face would be to devise a job evaluation scheme to measure the worth of
each job. Numerous evaluation schemes currently exist, but there are a
host of problems that make them less than satisfactory for use in a
comparable worth study.13 Others have discussed these problems, which
include possible sex biases in the description of jobs, the evaluation of
jobs and the determination of which job characteristics should be valued;
the statistical reliability of rater's evaluations; and the correlation of
job ratings (or the lack of such) across different evaluation schemes.'4
Nonetheless, as Table 1 indicates, several states have already conducted
formal job evaluation studies and used them to draw conclusions about
whether their female employees are underpaid relative to their male
employees whose jobs are evaluated to be of comparable worth.
The typical study used is based upon the factor point method.'5 The
characteristics of jobs are described and then a rater, or group of raters,
assigns point scores to each job on a number of dimensions. In the widely
used Hay Point method developed by Hay Associates, these dimensions include
"know—how,""problem solving,""accountability," and tiworking condi—
tions.ITIG Thepoints a job receives for each category are summed to get a11
total score, or measure of worth, for the job. The magnitudes of the wage
adjustments required by a comparable worth policy are obtained by either
directly computing how much less each female dominated job pays than male
dominated jobs with the same total point score, or by estimating a wage
equation in which male dominated jobs' wages are specified to be a function
only of their total point scores and then computing how much wages in
female dominated jobs lie below this estimated equation.
This methodology raises two issues: First, how sensitive are the
estimates of the individual occupational "comparable worth gaps", and the
average gap across occupations, to different functional form assumptions
about the male wage equation. If functional form assumptions influence the
results, careful consideration must be given to functional form and methods
to "statistically" choose the correct form used.17
Second, is it reasonable to sum the individual factor point scores to
get a total score? To do so implies that the marginal value a governmental
unit gets from an additional point is the same across factors. A more
general approach would be to estimate hedonic wage equations in which the
wage in a male dominated occupation was specified to be a function of the
individual factor point scores in the occupation; the resulting regression
coefficients would be estimates of the marginal value the government unit
placed on an additional point on each factor. If the marginal effects of
factor points on salaries differ across factors and if male and female jobs
with the same total factor point scores have a different distribution of
individual factor point Scores, then basing "comparable worth gap" esti-
mates solely on total hay Points may lead to erroneous conclusions.'812
This section uses data from job evaluation studies conducted in
Minnesota, Washington, and Connecticut to see how robust these studies'
results are to these modifications. Our calculations are meant to be
illustrative; the specific estimates we obtain of comparable worth gaps may
differ from those the studies themselves found because of differences in
the samples we use and the functional form assumptions we make.
A. Minnesota
Minnesota is one of the few states that has actually begun to imple-
ment "comparable worth" pay adjustments for ts employees. A Council on
the Economic Status of Women that had been monitoring the status of
state—employed women since 1916 found in 1981 that state job classifica-
tions remained heavily segregated by sex, female employees tended to be
overrepresented in low—paying clerical or service occupations, and the gap
between average earnings of state—employed males and females was alui,st
$5,000. This led the Council to establish a Task Force on Pay Equity to
examine salary differences between male and female jobs.
The State of Minnesota, in conjunction with flay Associaten, had begun
an evaluation of all state government jobs in 1919. Each position was
awarded Hay Points in four areas: Know—How, Problem—Solving, Accounta-
bility, and Working Conditions, as well as a total Hay Point score. These
evaluations were used by the Task Force which conducted analyses of the
maximum monthly salary for )88 positions in which at least 10 employees
were employed and which could be classified as either male (at least 70%
male incumbents) or female (at least 70% female incumbents) positions.
These analyses were primarily visual inspections of ncatt.ergrama and13
concluded that in almost every case the pay for female jobs was less than
the pay for male jobs with equal total Hay Point scores (see Council on
the Economic Status of Women (1982)). In most cases, female jobs also
received lower pay than male jobs with lower Hay Point totals. Estimates
of the cost of implementing pay equity, by raising salaries in each of the
female dominated classes to the lowest (highest) salary of a male dominated
class with the same number of flay Points (or the next lowest—rated male job
when no male job with the same number of points existed) were calculated to
be in the range of 2 to 4 percent of the totil salary base, or 20 to 40
million dollars.
Salaries of state employees in Minnesota are determined, for the most
part, through collective bargaining. After reviewing the above findings,
nd conducting some analyses of their own, the State of Minnesotaappro-
priated a total of 22 million dollars and distributed this sum among the
various bargaining units in proportion to their payrolls in the female
dominated classes.19 Each unit then bargained with the state over which
specific occupation titles would receive comparable worth wage adjustments
from these funds. The adjustments were paid in two stages (over $7
million in July 1983 and over $14 million in July 1984). Although in
practice only the "female—dominated" occupations have received such
adjustments, there is nothing in the law that restricts comparable worth
adjustments to these classes, the law requires that reanalyses and
reevaluations of the need for additional comparable worth adjustments be
undertaken every two years and a commitment has been made to fund addi-
tional adjustments during the 1985—87 period.14
The data from Minnesota are a convenient place for us to start, both
because the Hay Point system is one of the (if not the) most widely used
job evaluation system in the country and because Minnesota has already
begun to implement comparable worth adjustments based partially on the
original study. We obtained data from the original study, as of October
1981, for 188 job titles, on the number of incumbents (nj), the percent
female (PEN1), the total Hay Point Score (HPTj) and the maximum monthly
salary for the class (s).20 The State of Minnesota Department of Employee
Relations also provided us with a computer printout that listed, as of
November 1983, the individual factor point scores (Know-How (HP1j), Problem
Solving (HP2j), Accountability (H23j), and Working Conditions (uP41)) for
every state occupation title.21 Of the 188 job titles in the original
study, we were able to match factor job point scores to 150 job titles and
this subset of job titles became the sample we used in our analysis.22
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics from the factor point
score data that highlight a number of points. First, on average, male jobs
were more highly rated than female jobs: Second, average point scores and
the range of variation of point scores for the first three factors far
exceed the comparable variables for the fourth factor (Working Conditions).
Indeed, the small range of variation in this factor, the large number of
observations that have zero scores for it, and its small maximum value in
the sample of 29, as compared to a maximum of 400 for Know—How points,
reinforces the notion that one cannot simply add all factor point scores
together to get a total store.2.3 Third, focusing on the Individual factor
point scores as a share of total Hay Points, there are differences by sex;15
female jobs rank relatively high on the first (Know—How) factor and
relatively low on all other factors.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in these Minnesota data there
actually are not four truly independent job factors.24 The botto, panel of
Table 3 presents a correlation matrix of the individual factor point scores
and thetotalHay Point Score; it is striking that the correlations among
the first three factors scores and between each of them and the total
scores all exceed .94. Only the relatively unimportant (in magnitude)
working condition score is at all orthogonal to, or relatively uncorrelated
with, the other factor scores. These results suggest that with these
Minnesota data it will be difficult to disentangle the marginal effects of
individual factor points on wages and that wage equations that use the
total factor point scores asthesole explanatory variable are unlikely to
yield results very different from those that use the individual factor
point scores.
These conjectures are borne out inTables4and5.Table4presents
estimatesseparately for the male and female occupations of monthly maximum
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Here is a random error term and we have progressively regressed
monthly salaries on total Hay Points, the four individual factor point
scores, and the fourth factor point score plus the sum of the first three.
To see whether the results are sensitive to functional form assumptions, a
second set of estimates in Table 4 (equations (4)—(6)) use the logarithm of
monthly salary as the dependent variable; this is obviously only one of
many nonlinear functional forms with which one might experiment.
Because of the severe collinearity problems the results in Table 4
should not be stressed too heavily. They do suggest, however, that the
implicit weights assigned to individual factor point scores by the collec-
tive bargaining process differ across factors. For example, columns (2)
and (5) suggest that only the first and last factor point scores signifi—
êantly affect wages.25
What are the magnitudes of the "comparable wage gaps" implied by the
various estimates. That is, how sensitive are estimates of "comparable
wage gaps" to £he functional form used and to whether individual factor
point scores or total flay Point Scores are used in the analysis. For each
female occupation, we can compute what the occupation would have been paid
if it had been paid according to a given male wage equation. The resulting
percentage underpayment figures weighted by the number of employees in the
occupation can then be aggregated across occupations to come up with a mean
(over the female occupations) "comparable worth wage gap" estimate.
These estimates are presented in the top row of Table S for six
specifications of the male wage equatIon; they vary between —14.6 and —20.0
percent, a range that might be considered sufficiently narrow to be useful17
for public policy. Moreover, as the bottom rows of the table suggest, the
relative ranking of which female occupations are underpaid the most appears
to be insensitive to the estimation method used. The correlation across
female occupations of the various estimated wage gaps is at least .81.
Thus, the various methods yield very similar estimates about which of the
female occupational classes should receive the largest "comparable worth"
adjustments.
Insum, the estimates of "comparable worth gaps" implied by the
}linneaotadata were relatively insensitive to the functional forms used and
to the use of individual factor point scores instead of total Hay Points.
As we shall see, this isalso characteristic of the other two data bases we
examinein this section. Because the results for the three states are so
similar, our discussions of the Washington and Connecticut data are
relatively brief.
B) Washington26
Washington was the first state to undertake a formal factor point job
evaluation study, with the explicit objective of comparing salaries on male
dominated (more than 70% male) and female dominated (mote than 70Z female)
jobs. The study Wasconductedin 1974 by the Willis consulting firm and
covered121 job classifications. Its major conclusion was that female
dominated jobs tended to pay some 20 percent less than comparable valued
male Jobs. The study was updated iii1976and additional job categories
surveyed. The failure of the governor and state legislature to implement
the type of wage adjustments called for by the study led tD the litigation
that resulted in a December 1983 federal district court order mandating18
implementation of these adjustments (AFSCME v. State of Washington). This
decision is currently under appeal.
The Willis job evaluation system is similar to the Hay system and
awards points to jobs on the dimensions "knowledge and skill," "mental
demands,'"accountability," and "working conditions."27 Table 6 contains
descriptive statistics fromthefactor point scores for the 121 occupations
inthe original Willis study. While in this sample female dominated jabs
tend to have higher ratings than male jobs, most other patterns are similar
to those found in the Minnesota data. Again, the fourth factor (working
conditions) has a very small range of variation relative to the other
factors and the other three factors are very highly correlated. So, as
with the Minnesota data, there are really only two independent dimensions
ofjobsactually being evaluated by the Willis system and one, working
conditions, is obviously measured with considerable error.
Table 7 contains estimates of minimum salary equations similar to
those presented earlier for Minnesota.28 Maximum salary and mid—point of
the occupation's salary range were also available to us and because similar
results were obtained when they were used as the dependent variable, these
equations are omitted for brevity. Based upon these estimates and those in
Table 7, along with the factor point scores of the female occupations, one
can compute a set of estimated comparable worth gaps for each occupation as
before.
Estimatesofthe unweighted mean percentage wage gaps are found in
Tablea.29Therange iseven narrower here than itwas in the Minnesota
data,varying from 21.9 to 23.1 percent when the minimum salary data are19
used. Moreover, the correlation across estimation methods of the estimated
individual female occupational gaps is again very high; exceeding .89 in
all cases. The estimated comparable worth gaps are again relatively
insensitive to the functional- form and the decomposition of the factor point
scores used.
C) Connecticut3°
At the directive of the state legislature, Willis Associates was hired
to undertake a pilot job evaluation study of some 120 state occupations in
1979—1980. The study covered male—dominated, female—dominated and mixed
(30 to 70 percent male) occupations and was similar to the one Willis
conducted for Washington. It concluded that female—dominated jobs were
paid some 10 to 20 percent less than male jobs with comparable levels of
Willis points in the sample.
Based upon this and subsequent studies, a decision was made to
undertake, a comprehensive evaluation of all state positions. The resulting
job evaluation data will be provided to state employee unions who can use
it in future negotiations over wage scales. Although the state may
consider comparable worth in framing its bargaining position, it will
continue to consider a number of additional criteria, including market
conditions. As of 1983 the comprehensive evaluation had not yet been
completed, but the state had already agreed (in negotiations with three
unions whose members were priiárily females) to set aside 1 to 2 percent of
payroll per year into a fund that would eventually be used to finance
individual inequity adjustments.20
Tables 9, 10 and 11 provide estimates similar to those obtained for
the other states, using data from the Willis study for 84 occupations that
were either male or female dominated. The descriptive statistics in Table
9 confirm by now familiar patterns; little variation in working condition
points relative to other factors, differential weighting by sex of the
importance of the different factors in the total score, and the extremely
high correlation of the first three factors. The latter again suggests
there are only two real factors——working conditions and everything else.
Table 10 presents estimates of male and female average annual salary
equations.31 These estimates strongly suggest (at least for males) that
different weights should be applied to the different factors;indeed working
conditions receives a negative weight in the male equations.32 Based upon
these estimates, one can again estimate the mean comparable worth gap
generated by each method, as well as the correlation of the gap estimates
for individual occupations across methods, and these are found in Table 11.
The mean percentage gap estimate ranges between 15.4 and 20.2 percent,
which is broader than the Washington range but about the same range as
found in the Minnesota data. The correlation ottheindividual occupa-
tional wage gap estimates across estimation methods, although high, is not
as high as before; for these data we observe correlations as low as .73.
D) Summary
In sum, our analyses of data from the Minnesota, Washington and
Connecticut comparable worth job evaluation studies suggests that in those
three cases estimates of the average differential, or the ranking of
differentials across occupations, are not very sensitive to the functional21
form used or whether total job points are decomposed into their individual
factor point scores. While these results should be gratifying to pro-
ponents of comparable worth, we stress that they hold for particular
samples of data. It is incumbent upon future studies of other governmental
units to perform sensitivity analyses of the type we have undertaken
here.33
IV.OccupationalMobility
Total Compensation on a job includes both pecuniary and nonpecuniary
forms of compensation. The above mentioned studies focus on wages and
working conditions; the latter obviously poorly measured by the various
evaluation systems. Fringe benefits tend to be ignored because most
individuals employed i0 a bargaining unit presumably receive the same
package of benefits, although some benefits may vary with seniority and
rank.
Another, possibly important omission, is the studies failure to
include opportunities for occupational mobility and subsequent wage growth.
If male workers in government have fewer opportunities for occupational
mobility than female workers, the observed current wage gaps of the
previous section may merely be compensating wage differentials and would
not call for any comparable worth adjustments.
To test if this occurs requires one to have longitudinal earnings data
and job evaluation scores for a sample of male and female public employees.
Such data is not readily available. However, it is possible to provide
evidence that is suggestive, using data from the 1/100 sample of the 197022
Census of Population. We illustrate how this can be done with data from
New York State.
The 1910 CensuS of Population includes information on an individual's
industry and occupation of employment in both 1965 and 1970, his or her
1969 earnings level, and whether he or she was a state or local government
employee in 1970. If one assumes that government employees who remained in
the same 3—digit industry between 1965 and 1970 were also government
employees in 1965 then we may focus on this group's occupational
mobility.34 Mean earnings in 1969 by 3—digit public sector occupation can
be constructed from the Census data and then the ratio of 1969 mean
earnings in an individual's 1970 occupation to 1969 mean earnings in an
individual's 1965 occupation used as a measure of occupational mobility.35
Table 12 presents the results of regressions in which the logarithm of
this variable is regressed on whether the individual is a state or a local
government employee, the individual's age (as of 1975), the logarithm of
the 1969 mean earnings in his or her 1965 occupation (to control for
initial job level), weeks worked intervals for 1969 (as a measure of labor
market attachment), and the individual's sex. These results suggest
that, as defined, occupational mobility is lower for state employees than
local employees, declines over the relevant age range with age, is lower
for individuals initially in high earnings occupations and is lower for
individuals with weak labor force attachment, Crucially, it is also lower
for females than for males.36
Although our data are crude, this latter result suggests that observed
male/female earnings differentials for jobs with equal job evaluation23
scores probably are not compensating earnings differentials for better
female occupational mobility prospects. Indeed, these results suggest that
the male/female comparable worth gap may be larger than has been estimated
by the analyses in the previous section. As noted above, however, precise
tests would require much more detailed data. 3
V. Employment Adjustments
As noted in the introduction, CIQWAwouldlikely alter at least four
types of relative prices that public employers face. First, for any given
function (e.g., police) and within any major occupational group the average
wage of female employees would rise relative to the average wage of male
employees, as some female employees received CWWA. Second, across major
occupational groups, the average wage of employees in heavily "female"
occupations would rise relative to the average wages of employees in
heavily"male" occupations, as more employees in the former would receive
CWWA.Third,across functions, the average wage in heavily female domi-
nated functionswould rise relative to the average wage in heavily male
dominated functions, as employees in the former would again be more likely
to receive CWWA. Finally, the average wage of public employees would rise
relative to the prices of other goods and services.
To the extent that public employers' employment decisions are sensi—
tive to their employees' wage rates, these changes should lead respectively
to the substitution of some male for some female employees within a
function—occupation group, the substitution of some employment in male
dominated occupations for some employment in female dominated occupations24
(withina function), the substitution of some employment in male dominated
functions for some employment in female dominated functions, and a decline
in the aggregate level of public employmentFor all these reasons, CWWA
should lead to a decline in female employment.
This section reports our attempts to esttmate the extent to which some
of these adjustments might occur and then to simulate the potential
employment effects of a CWWA. Unfortunately, data are not currently
available to us on a detailed function by occupation by sex breakdown, so
the estimates discussed below typically aggregate employees across occupa-
tions within a function, or across functions within an occupation.38 These
types of aggregations make it difficult to estimate substitution
elasticities.
Publisheddatapermit us to estimate the extent to which the ratio of
male to female public administration employees varies across SMSA's with
the ratio of male to female earnings in the industry. Public administra-
tion employees are employed in executive and legislative offices; general
government (n.e.c.); justice, public order and safety; and the adminis-
tration of various government programs. While many government employees
are employed in these categories, public administration does not include a
number of governmental functions, such as hospitals and education. As a
result the category represents less than half of all state and local
government employment.39
Table 13 presents estimates based on published SMSA level data from
the 1970 and 1980 Census of Population volumes. In each case the logarithm
of the ratio of male to female public administration employees (LRE) is25
regressed on the logarithm of the ratio of male public administration
ewiployees' median earnings to female public administration employees'
median earnings (11W), the logarithm of total public administration
employment (LT), and the logarithm of the ratio of the male to female labor
force (LRL).Thelatter two variables are included as crude controls for
differences in the occupational mix and male/female public administration
applicant ratio across SNSAs.
Columns U)and(2) report estimates based on the 1980 data; it is
not possible to separate out federal employees from state and local
employees in these data and total government figures are used. While as
expected the sex ratio in the labor force is positively related to the sex
ratio in government employment, the latter is also positively associated
with the sex ratio in wages in that year. That is, there is no evidence in
the 1980 data that higher female wages are associated with lower female
employment levels.
In contrast, the 1970 data do suggest that the association between
male/female employment and wage ratios is negative (Ccl. 3). However, this
appears to be true primarily for federal employees (CoT. 4), where a 10
percent increase in the male/female wage ratio is associated with all B
-percentdecrease in the employment ratio. State and local government
employees (CoT. 5) display no such association.
The difference in results btween the 1970 and 1980 data is puzzling.
One possible explanation is that it is due to different SMSAs being
included in each year's sample. When the 1980 equations are reestimated n
the subsample of 118 SMSAs that appeared in the 1970 sample, however, one26
still observes a positive relative wage coefficient.4° Attempts to appeal
to omitted variable bias also did not prove fruitful, as when a fixed
effects model was estimated using data from both years (cot. 5), no
significant coefficients were obtained.
Independent of the results, these analyses of the published Census
data are unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. They permit only the
crudest control for differences in the occupational mix across areas. They
contain no information on the characteristics of male and female employees
that might affect their relative productivity (e.g., education and age) and
hence relative employment levels. They do not permit us to separate state
from local employees. Finally, they cover only a small fraction of all
state and local government employees.
Many of these problems can be remedied using individual data from the
A sample of the 1980 Census of Population; a 5 percent sample for each
state. We aggregated state-employees' data by state and local government
employees' data by SMSA to get samples of 49 and 177 observations respec-
tively.41 The data were stratified into education and noneducation
employees and, within each of these "industries", into 4 occupational
groups; professional and managerial employees (occupation codes 001—199),
technical, sales and administrative support employees (o.c. 203—389),
service (including protective service) employees (O.C. 403—469) and all other
(including craft, repair, laborer, and transportation equipment operator)
employees (O.C. 473—889).27
Suppose that within each of then occupational groups the quantity of





WhereQMQFisa measure of the quality of males (females) employed in
the occupation, 14(1) is a measure of male (female) employment in the
occupation and A,B and S are parameters. If the only cost of labor is the




where W(Wy) is the male (female) wage and a1 is an estimate of minus
the elasticity of substitution between males and females in the occupation.
Table 14 presents estimates for state employees of this relative demand
equation for each of the four occupational groups in education and nonedu—
cation. Equations are estimated with both relative employment and relative
person hours as the dpendent variable. Each equation includes the
logarithm of male to female earnings in the industry—occupation cell (LR2)
and, as proxies for the relative quality of males and females in the
occupation, the logarithms of the ratio of average age (LR4) and average
education level (L1t5) of males to females in the industry—occupation cell.
In addition, to control for supply factors, some equations include the
logarithm of a measure of the overall male/female wEge ratio in the state
(LZ1) and the logarithm of the male/female labor force ratio in the state28
(LU).Weexpect the former to be negatively and the latter to be posi-
tively associated with male/female relative employment in the industry—
occupational cell.
-
Wheresignificant, the control variables (LR4,LRS,LZl, LZ2) all have
the expected sign. Unfortunately,the evidence on the substitutability of
malesfor females is much weaker. For noneducation, when relative employ-
ment is the dependent variable there are no significant relative wage
elasticities. Whenrelativeperson hours (which probably is preferable) is
used, male/female substitution appears to occur only in the 'other"
category, where a 10% increase in the wage ratio is associated roughly with
a 6.5% decrease in the hours ratio. Elasticities in this range and larger
are observed for state employees in education in the technical and adminis-
trative support and "other" categories. Rowever, here seemingly perverse
positive relative wage coefficient. are found in the professional category.
Table 15 presents estimates of the relative wage coefficients from
similarly specified equations- for local government employees, with SMSAS as
the units of observation. To avoid errors induced by averages constructed
from very small samples, the analyses here are restricted to SNSAs in which
at least 4 (or B) individuals of each sex were contained in the data for
each occupation—industry cell. While it would have been preferable to
require a larger minimum number of observations in each cell, the tabula-
tion of the resulting sample sizes from these restrictions that is found at
the bottom of Table 15 suggests even these restrictions substantially
reduce the number of observations available.29
The results in this table are not strongly supportive of the vithin—
occupation male—female substitution hypothesis. There is some evidence for
both education and noneducation that substitution takes placeamong
technical and administrative support employees. However, for education
employees, in some specifications relative wages arc positively associated
with relative employment levels for both the professional and "other"
categories.
Takentogether, the results in Tables 14 and 15 are not strongly
supportive of the hypothesis that within broad occupational groups
male/female employmentratios are negatively associated with male/female
wage ratios, whether this reflects the failure of substitution to exist,
heterogeneity induced by using broad occupational categories, or the
omission of other important explanatory variables is unclear. Unfortu-
nately sample sizes within cells in these data are usually too small to
permit teøts of substitutability within finer occupational groups.
If one assumes that substitution between miles and females is not
possible within these broad occupational groups, one can aggregate across
sexes within groups to come up with estimates of the average wage paid in
each occupation (wj). The data also permit the computation of the share of
the payroll paid to each occupational group (s1). One can thus estimate





to test whether substitution of employees acrossoccupationsodeurs in
response to changes in wages in the different occupations.4230
If such substitution occurs, given estimates of how CWWA would change
the average wage in each occupation, one can then compute the resulting
changes in factorsharesand, holding the total employment budget constant,
the change in total and female employment in each occupation. To these
changes, one can add estimates of the employment changes caused by the
responseof the employment budget to the CWWA inducedchange in the average
wage in the sector and thus obtain an estimate of the overall effect of
CWWA on female employment in the sector.
As is well—known, the output constant own wage elasticity of demand
(Di) for each occupation is given by
Di —(a1
+ —
Andeach of these elasticities should be negative.43 In addition, to
satisfy the homogeneity property——that a doubling of all wages would not
alter the share spent on each occupation——it is necessary that
(8) a1+a12+a34a4O foreachj.
Finally, to satisfy the symmetry property——that the Allen Elasticity of
substitution of occupation I for occupation j be equal to the elas-
ticity of occupatlDn j for occupation i ——it must be the case that
(9)ajjaj1forall1.￿J.-31
The restrictions summarized in (7)—(9) provide a convenientway of testing
if the data are consistent with the share equations specified in equation
(6).
Tables 16 and 17 provide estimates, for the state and localgovernment
samples respectively, of the occupational, share equations derived from the
translog expenditure function. In each case estimates are provided of the
unconstrained system, of the system with homogeneity imposed, and of the
system with both homogeneity and symmetry imposed. Since the four occupa-
tional shares must sum to unity, the coefficients of any wage variable must
sum across equations in each system to zero. Hence, we infer the value of
the coefficients of the last equation from estimates of the first three.
The estimates are obtained using an instrument for each of thewage
variables and an estimation method that takes account of the correlation of
the error terms across equations.4
These estimates provide mixed support for the translog specification.
On the one hand, in 3 of the 4 systems (education/state, noneducation/ state,
education/local) one cannot reject the hypothesis that the homogeneity and
symmetry restrictions ((8) and (9)) are satisfied. On the other hand, the
majority of the individual regression coefficients are statistically
insignificantly different from zero in all of the systems estimated. One
senses that this contributes to the above results. Moreover, the own wage
elasticities of demand they imply when symmetry and homogeneity are imposed
(Table 18) are negative in only 9 of the 16 cases.
The mixed nature of these results suggest that one should take
predictions they generate with a grainof salt.Nonetheless they can be32
used, along with knowledge of the share of expenditures on each category,
the proportion of bouts worked by females in each category, the male and
female wages in each category, female employment in each category, and an
assumption about what CWWA would do to female wages, to generate predic-
tionsabout the effect of CWWA on female employment due to substitution
away from female dominatedoccupations, holdingthe total employment budget
constant. The appendix sketches somewhat formally how this is done.
Illustrative simulations appear in Table i9 where we have assumed CWWA
wouldraisethe wage of all female employees by 20 percent.46
Althoughthe implied percentagechangesinfemaleemployment in each
occupation varies across industry (education or noneducation) and sector
(state or local), the implied average change in overall female employment
Is remarkablysimilar across industryand sector. The20percentCWWAis
predicted to reduce female employment in education by almost 6 percent and
femaleemployment in noneducation byabout 5.5 percent. These figures are
the averages for all observations inthe sample; as the bottom rows of the
tablesuggest the predicted losses vary across observations, with the range
of predicted losses being larger for local government employees.
We must stress, however, that these simulations assume that the total
employment budget remains constant in the face of the CWWA. This is
roughly equivalent to assuming that in the aggregate the wage elasticity of
demand for state and local government employees is unity. That is, they
assumethat any given increase in the average wage of state and local
government employees wouid result in an equal percentage decrease in
aggregatestate and local government employment.33
In fact, studies of the aggtegate (by function) wage elasticity of
demand for state and local government employees typically find wage
elasticities of demand that are less than unity.47 Thus, an increase in
the average wage would increase the total employment budget; the calcula-
tions in Table 19 therefore overstate the decline in female employment that
would occur.
Some idea of the magnitude of the overstatement can be obtained from
the following crude calculations. Based on knowledge of the ratios of male
to female wages and of male to female hours in each industry/sector, we
calculate that a 20 percent increase in wages for females would increase
the average wages of state education, state noneducation, local education
and local noneducation employees by about 8, 7.5. 11.5 and 5.5 percent,
respectively.48It is reasonable to take —.5 asa "best" estimate of the
aggregatewage elasticity of demand for noneducational ewployees in the
state and local sector and —.75 as the comparable estimate for educational
employees.49These elasticities imply employment budget increases for
state education, state noneducation, local education and local noneducation,
respectively, of 2, 3.75, 2.9 and 2.75 percent. Such increases would
reduce the female employment declines predicted by Table 13 by roughly
half.
Insum, our simulations suggest that the decline In female employment
caused by a 20 percent CWWA for all female employees in the state and local
sector would be quite small, probably falling in the range of 2 to 3
percent. These somewhat surprisingly small estimates are a direct result
of our inability to find much substitutability of malet' for females within34
major occupational groups, or much substitutability across major occupa-
tional groups as relative wages change.50
VI. Concluding Remarks
At the theoretical level, we conclude that the case for comparable
worth rests on the argument that the current distribution of female
employees is based on discriminatory barriers which existing legislation
have not broken down. If this argument is valid, the desirability of
comparable worth depends upon one's perceptians of how the benefits it
provides contrasts with the efficiency losses it induces and, given the
trade—of fs involved, ultimately one's position on comparable worth must
depend on value judgements.
Turning to the public sector, our empirical analyses in Section III
suggest that existing estimates of comparable worth wage gaps in the states
of Connecticut, Minnesota, and Washington are relatively insensitive to the
functional forbi of the earnings equation estimated and to whether total job
points are decomposed into their individual factor point scores. While
these results should be gratifying to proponents of comparable worth, we
stress the need to perform sensitivity analyses of the type we have
undertaken for studies of other governmental units in the future.
These results are based on job evaluation systems (flay or Willis) that
purport to measure four distinct characteristics of jobs; in the case of
the Hay System these are "Know—How," "Problem—solving," "Accountability"
and "Working Conditions". As described in Section III, the latter charac-
teristic is obviously measured with substantial error and the first three35
are so highly correlated that it is unlikely that they capture more than
one dimension of a job.
-
Asa result, we must be somewhat skeptical about
what these job evaluation systems are actually measuring and, if job
evaluation systems are to be used in comparable worth studies, suggest
that more thought be given to their design.
Ouranalysesin Section IV called attention to the need to focus on
forms of compensation in addition to current wages and working conditions
in judging the "total" compensation of a job. In particular, we stressed
the need for longitudinl earnings data for individuals initially in each
job category to test if observed occupational wage differentials are
partially compensating differentialI for different opportunities for
occupational mobility.
Finally, our analyses in Section V found little evidence that intra—
occupational male/female employment ratios in the SLO sector are sensitive
to intraoccupational male/female wage ratios or that the SLO occupational
distribution of employment is sensitive to the SLG occupational distri-
bution of wages. These results imply, in our simulations, that the decline
in female employment caused by a CWWA for all female SLGemployeeswould be
surprisingly small. Indeed, we estimate that a 20 percent CWWAforall SLO
female employees would lead to only a 2 to 3 percent decline in female
employment.
Opponents of comparable worth night claim these estimates are muth.
too low and point to problems in our empirical analyses. These include
using broad definitions of occupations (only 4), aggregating all noneduca—
tion employees into one group, aggregating all governmental units in an36
SMSA together, basing analyses often on small sample sites, and using wage
variables that are subject to considerable measurement error. Our analyses
were dictated by the nature of the Census data we used and we hope to
undertake analyses in the future of other data bases (see footnote 38)
what would provide larger sample sizes1 greater functional breakdown., and
data at the individual governmental level. Moreover, now that several
states have begun to adopt comparable worth, the employment effects of the
policy may be directly inferred after a few years from their experiences.
However, while our personal priors were that we would find larger estimates
of potential job loss for females, it seems reasonable at least temporarily
to take our current findings at face value.37
Footnotes
1. See, for example, Donald Treiman and Heidi Hartmann, eds. (1981).
2.This statementis attributed in a number of places to former EEOC
Chair Eleanor Holmes Norton.
3. Zxplanations for why this occurred include that public decision
makers are more likely to be swayed by public, opinion calling for such
policies than are private profit maximizing firmsandthat increases in
female wages in the public sector caused by comparable worth wage adjust-
ments are likely to lead to only small employment losses because the demand
for public employees is likely to be inelastic. Empirical evidence for
Australia, where a similar policy was implemented, provides some support
for the latter claim (see Robert 0. Gregory and Robert C. Duncan (1981)),
see Section V for evidence we offer for the United States.
4. Tables 1 and 2 and the next two paragraphs draw heavily on
research being conducted by our colleague Alice Cook. We are most grateful
to Professor Cook for sharing her materials with us; and she should not be
held responsible for our interpretations of them. For earlier evidence on
the spread of comparable worth in the state and local sector, see Alice
Cook (1983) and National Committee on Pay Equity (forthcoming).
5. In AFSCME V.Stateof Washington. lot details see "Immediate Halt
to Bias in Wages in Statd of Washington Ordered, New York TImes, December
15, 1983.38
6.lJbileour empirical analyses focus on the state and local sector,
there is considerable interest in the federal sector as well. Nearings on
comparable worth have been conductedby severalCongressional committees,
for example, U.S. House of Representatives (1982).
7. See Barbara Bergmann (1984) and Mark Killingsworth (1984a, 1984b,
1984c), respectively, for more complete analytical treatments of the cases
for and against comparable worth.
8. That job evaluation scores must be reconsidered as internal and
external conditions change has long been recognized by institutional
economists. For a recent discussion, see Donald Schwab (1984).
9. Another possible efficiency loss is the reduced incentive females
would have to obtain training for the higher paying "male" occupations,
since increasing the wage in "female" occupations via comparable worth wage
adjustments reduces the return to training investments.
10. See Ronald Ehrenberg and Joshua Schwarz (forthcoming) for
citations to the literature.
11. This point has been made by Killingsworth (1984W.
12. Another remdy would be lump sum payments that are specified as a
function of years of service in the occupation. This would have the
advantage of making the size of the remedy a function of the magnitude of
the loss and would not reduce employment of women in the occupation.
13. See Donald fleiman (1979) for a discussion of current job
evaluation schemes.
14. See Treiman and Hartman, eds. (1981) and Schwab (1984).
15. See Treiman (1979).39
16.These are defined asfollows:
"Know How is the sum total of every kind of skill; however
acquired,needed for acceptable job performance"
"ProblemSolving isthe original "self—Startingt' thinking
requiredbythe job for analyzing, evaluating, creating.
reasoning,arriving at, and making conclusions"
"Accountabilityis the answerabilityforan action and for the
consequences thereof"
"WorkingConditionsare madeupof physical effort, environment
and hazards".
See Treiman (1929), pp. 161—165 for elaborations of these definitions and
copies of the Hay System Guide Charts for assigning points for each of the
factors.
17. See G. Box and D. Cox (1964), for example.
18. Others have suggested similar approaches, for example, Treiman
and Hartmann (1981) and Pierson, et al. (1984). Some, however, resist any
determination of factor weights that use existing wage scale data, arguing
that these weights will reflect the net effects of any market discrimina-
tion that exists. See, for e,çample, K. C. Blumrosen (1979).
19.Thediscussion in thisparagraphcomes from a November 10, 1983
telephone conversation with James Lee of the Minnesota Department of
Employee Relations and from an August6, 1984 letter from Helen Remick.
20. Council on the Economic Status of Women (1982), Appendix I.
While only maximumsalarydata were available for Minnesota, results we
report below for the State of Washington suggest that the une of average or
minimum wage scale data would not appreciably change the results.40
21. Minnesota Department of Employee Relations (1983).
22. Eleven of the titles in the original study did not appear in the
latter list. Twenty—seven others were either upgraded or downgraded so
that the total Hay Point Scores for the title did not match on the two data
sources. It is interesting to note the male job titles were much more
likely to be upgraded than female titles (11.5% vs. 3.5%). This may
reflect systematic errors that led to the undergrading of male jobs in the
original evaluations or systematic attempts to overgrade male jobs to
protect customary wage differentials in the latter. Without further
information one cannot conclude whether either hypothesis is correct.
23. The Bay Point System used in Minnesota assigns working condition
points only to non—exempt jobs and defines most clerical jobs as having
normal working conditions (and therefore zero working condition points).
This is an example of how existing job evaluation plans may be sex biased
and leads one to consider how systematic sex based measurement errors might
influence estimates of comparable worth wage gaps. Donald Schwab and Dean
Wichern (1983) address this issue and discuss the usefulness of reverse
regression methods in ascertaining if such measurement errors exist.
24. That compensable factors in factor point systems are often
redundant has long been recognized. See Schwab (1984) for citations to the
literature. That the Hay Poidt System (in these data) leads in actuality
to only two factors, at least one which is subject to considerable measure-
ment error (see !bove), is probably less well—known.41
25. Somewhat strikingly, adding the percentage of female employees in
an occupation (YEN) to either the male or female wage equations, results in
that variable's having a negative coefficient (columns (la), (4a)). Even
in female—dominated occupations, an increase in thefemaleshare of
employment leads to lover wages.
26. See Helen Remick (1980) (1984), for a more complete discussion of
the Washington study.
21. See Remick (1980) for a discussion of the Willis system.
28. Percent female in the occupation was not available in these data.
29. The unweighted mean is used here because occupational, employment
levels were not available.
30. The next two paragraphs are drawn from material in Cook (1983)
which should be consulted for more details.
31. Salary informatian were obtained from charts in Norman D. Willis
(1980) which plotted annual compensation versus total Hay Points for broad
job families. Since compensation was rounded to the nearest two hundred
dollars there, it is not surprising that the R2 in Table 10 are smaller
than the comparable ones in Tables 4 and 7. In several cases where a male
and a female job a) were in the same job family, b) had identical Willis
points and c) paid different salaries, it proved impossible for us to
assign the salaries to each job. As a result, six male and six female jobs
in the original survey were excluded from our sample.
32. Formal F tests of whether the implicit weights on each factor
differ in the male wage equations, are found in Appendix table 1 for all
three states.42
33. A study that does this for a sample of job titles in Michigan, as
well as contrasting the results of two different job evaluation methods, is
Arthur Young (n.d.). fleiman (1964) has stressed that factor weights can
have substantial effects on the rankings of jobs if the factors are not
highly correlated.
34. This creates obvious selection bias problems as we are ignoring
the opportunity for mobility out of the government sector.
35. While the 3—digit census occupation breakdown is the most
detailed one available in the data, its categories are actually quite
broad. In our sample only 16 percent of the individuals changed occupa-
tions over the five—year period.
36. Given our knDwledge of the relative steepness of male and female
age—earnings profiles in the population this result is not unexpected.
37. Another nonwage factor that may be important is turnover coats.
If two job titles rated to be of comparable worth required the same
firm—specific training investments, but turnover was higher in the first
position, employers would necessarily pay lower wages to employees in that
job title. To test if this was a contributing factor to estimated compar-
able worth wage gaps requires data on quit rates by job title. One must be
cautious in drawing inferences here; as is well known low wages also Jead
to higher quits, which makes it difficult to infer the direction of
causation.
3B. We currently are negotiating with the EEOC for more detailed data
on a function/occupation/sex breakdown and hope to use these data in later
work.43
39. Only 27 percent of the government employees in the New York data
used in SectionIVwere employed in public administration.
40.See Table 13, notes a and b.
41.the A sample contains data for 50 states and 180 SMSAS. At the
time these analyses were undertaken, however, the data tape for Colorado
(and its 3 $MSAs) was not available at Cornell.
42. Implicit in this formulation is the notion that public sector
decision makershave well—defined utility functions that depend on the per
capita employmentlevels of various categories of public employees and that
the parameters of those functions do not vary systematically across areas
with public employeewages. For discussions of this approach and analyses
thatuse functional, rather than occupational data,see Orley Ashenfelter
andRonald Ehrenberg (1975) and Ronald Ehrenberg (1973).
43. See Daniel ifamermesh (forthcoming).
44. See Daniel Hamermesh and James Grant (1979).
45. the need for insrumental variables can beillustrated in the
two—occupationcase. Let Mi(Fj) be the number of male (female) hours
employed in occupation i and Wxj(WFj) the wage rate of males (females)
in occupation i. Then the shares (Sj)andaverage wages (Wj) in the














112 —(WN2M2+ WF2FZ)/(M2 + F2)
It is obvious that each Sj is positively correlated with its own wage rate
and negatively correlated with the other wage rate; these correlations
would bias the coefficient estimates of equation (6).
To remove these mechanical correlations, instruments for the occupa-
tional wage rates are created by regressing these wage rates on median
income in the area, area population, male and female wages in the area
(state data only), and mean ages and education levels of males and females
in the occupation. The system is then estimated using the 3SL5 option in
MS.
46. This figure is consistent with the CW wage gap estimates pre-
sented in section III for Connecticut, Minnesota and Washington. A lower
figure would yield proportionately lower employment loss estimates.
47. See Threnberg and Schwarz (forthcoming), Table 3 for a summary of
the results from all these studies.
48. These are crude calculations that ignore the interoccupational
substitution that would take place.
49. Ehrenberg and Schwarz (forthcoming)1 Table 3.
50. We should stress that these simulations also ignore the possi-
bility that CWWA may increase the attractiveness of "female" occupations to
males and reduce the extent to which females are excluded from "male"
occupations (since the wage advantage in "male" jobs would no longer
exist). These factors would create additional, conflicting, pressures on45
female employment levels. They also ignore any effects of the increased
total public sector employment budget on private sector employment levels.46
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Status of coaparable Worth lnItLatives hi State.
.Sthe District ofColuobia.S,iaor 19B4
(1) CII) (lit) (IV)
Zaisteateof a ZflsteAceof
"Conorabte Vocth' State LegislationEalatence I.pleeeritatlon
Job Evaluaticit .1.tit'g to -of of
Stat. Study Carable WorthLttigatioaCoeparabi. Worth
£hbon
Alaska tn—a Tee—Art965 Yes
Arkansas No tn—A—1935 No lb
California No Tea—L-1949 Ito No
1—1983
Colorado No No No No
Casnecticut Yes—b No lee Te.—l
Deiaare No Yes—A—lOS) No No
D.C. No No 1o No
florida Yes-c Tes-C—19B4 we No
C.oria No Tes—A-1966 No lb
Ianti ta—c fls—A-l95l to. No
Idaho Tn—b Yee—A—1969 No Yes—4
Illinois Yes—b Tn—C—1984 Tee No
Indiana No
- Tes—D-1984 No No
lava Tn—s Tes—A—1953 !4o Ye.—2
Xan..s Yes—a No lie No
lentucky Toe—b Tc.—A—1966 No U.
tai.iaaa Ye.—. No No Tes—2
Usia. tes—a,b Tn—A—1954 No 14o
KanLand Tee—b Ye.—A-1965 No Ito
lIa..achusotts Yes—a Ies—A—1943 Yes
- No
Nichilan Te.—b Tes—A—1962 Ten No





Missouri Mo Tes-C—19$4 No No
Moatana Yes—b No lb lb
Nebraska Yes—b No No No
Nevada No No No No
5ev Rapsblro Yea—a lb lb No
1kv Jersey Tcs—b Ye.—D—1953 No No
No.1 Mnlco Tee—a lb No Tes—2
Nov York You—a )1o So NoTable I (coin lnh.ed)
(1) (ii) (Lit) (1W)
Eilte'in-uf is Es iLvct• or
"Cooparable Worth"State LegislationE'lsttac*l.plt.ontatioq
JobEvalustion Ulating to of ci
State SOJJY C.cpnrjbIc Worth LitIv'tloo CcepariTh%u Wnrth
North Carolina Ito lo No No
Norti. Dakots Tel—b 1° Yes—S
01.10 Teat Jo No No
C&labcsa No Yes-A—19&$ No No
Or.goa Tn-s ks—A-1983 No No
PeuiasyIvan. Yes—b No Yes No
Ibod. Island Yes—a No No No
South Carolina Ito
South Dakota No Tes.A-1966 No No
tennt.s.t Ta—. Plo No
Texas No No No No
Utah No No No No
Venont Yes—b No
Virginia Toe—b No No No
Va.hington Yes—b Yes.-F—1983 Yes Tes—3
Vest Virginia No No Ito No
Viecoasin Ye.—. Ye.—A—196S No No
Vyoning No No No No
Sources Authors' intarpretat2ot. of material coatainod inunpublised tables prepared by
Professor Alice Cook (Cornell Univera ity. based upon responses to questionnaires
she mailed in Novber 1983 to state personnel directors, heads of cosittees
on the status of votea and pijblic etployee witon leaders.
where
* no respoasa to the questionnaire
aad
1—a formal eocparableworth" job evaluation study is underway
b format "cospar.bloworth" job evaluationstudywas coopleted
tabulationof fetate/male pay dif fereritials by broad occupational classeshes
been confleted
the stat. is contenplating • job evaluation study
Il—Astate statute that mandaLes eçual pay instate etployei't for jobs of
conparable worth exists (y1ar adopted)
S statestatutethat calls for periodic reviews of salaries i.. job ciasea
dooinsted by vonen
Clegisistioti introduced (or being drafted) but not yet enacted
D fuadsappropriated to study the issue
lawrequires political subdivisions todolob evaluationsand it.stitute
salary stncture based on comparable worth
F lay require. i.plenv'.tationofcospar obte worth
llI—Te•st least oae Iroupofstate etptoyees is in litigation over the issue
1W—Iipiesented.or gearirmu p to lap Icment • throi;h the collective b,rgaining
process•over, numb crofyars
inpieuented. orgcarin upto lapkisent. through tile legislative process.
over a rhsI*er of yeats
3 to be Imp lemtated tIcoughcourt order
4 Ji.plt;.ented by tI,. SLat.,. I.ut attnwsuiikcL force, to i.tFliseu,cC,Il.iriC
nottc',IIy t-oiu;..rahb .orth
3tmptrmcntn4cnp'fl'.tti,flbasedanaractor peint•y,ttm to iitI'lnwC ovrrnll
equity. not traity cnndder.J n nntarahlv w,rtl,Table 2








Palo Alto, Ca. (2)
San Prancisco, Ca. (1)
San Jose, Ca. (1)(4)
Santa Cruz, Ca. (1)(3)
S. Lake Tahoe, Ca. (1)
Colorado Springs, Col. (1)(3)
Minneapolis, Minn. (1)
St. Paul, Miun. (1)
Portland, Ore. (1)
Philadelphia, Pa. (2)







Contra Costa, Ca. (1)(3)
Humboldt, Ca. (l)(3)
Santa Clara, Ca. (1)(2)(3)













Los Angeles. Ca. (1)(2)








(1) "comparable worth" job evaluation study underway or completed
(2) atleast one group of employees is in litigation over the issue
(3)comparable worth wage adjustments contemplated or implemented
(4) comparable worth wage adjustments ftaplementcdafter a strike
Source: Authors'interpretation ofmaterial contained in unpublished tables prepared
byProfessor Alice Cook (CornellUniversity), basedupon responses to
questionnaires she mailedinNovember 1983 to state personnel directors.
heads of committees onthestatus of womenandpublic employee union
leaders.
CountiesTable 3
Descriptive Statistics: Minnesota Data
Male Jobs(N102) Female Jobs(N=48)
Mean (StdDcv.) Mm.Max. Mean (Std. Dev.) Mm.Max.
aPi 168.7 (63.3) 76 400 118.8 (40.3) 66 230
HP2 50.9 (33.5) 10 200 27.6 (18.1) 8 87
11P3 60.1 (41.0) 16 264 32.7 (20.1) 12 100
1124 5.4( 7.2) 0 29 .1.4 C3.4) 0 14
UPIF .609(.043) .677 (.052)
HP2F .164( .036) .141 (.030)
IIP3F .197(.039) .171 (.027)
1W4P .030(.041) .010 (.026)
Correlation Matrices
Male Jobs Female Jobs
an 1122 11P3 UP4 1121 BP2 11P3 1124
m'i 1.00 1.00
1W2 .98 1.00 .99 1.00
11P3 .94 .97 1.00 .97 .97 1.00
1424 —.60 —.58 —.52 1.00 —.24 —.21 —.19 1.00




RP4— Working Condition Points
Nfl — Total flay Points
14231 — Share of Category3Points inTotal HayPoints
Source: Authors' calculations fromcbtain Pay_Equity and Public Erm1ovtent
(Council on the Econoraic Status of Wcnen , St. I'jul • Nsnn. •rci I Jfl)
and Swrnary of Evahtati.'os l%v TLtIe (State of Minneaotn Uepartrtnt of





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimates of Percentage "Comparable Worth Gap"
for MinnesotaData: Alternative Estimation Methods
Mean Percentage Cap —16.8 —18.3 —14.6 —16.1 —16.7 —20.0
Correlation of Differentials .97 .93 .98 .99 .97
Across 48 Female Job Classes .82 .94 .97 .99
D3 .93 .93 .8L
D4 .98 .93
D5 .97
where differentials are computed for each female job class using Hay Point score
for the class and the coefficients from the male wage equations in Table 4.
uses equation (1)5usesequation (2) D5 uses equation (3)
uses equation (4) D4 uses equation (5) uses equation (6)Mean Max. Mean Max.
WILl 115.0 46.7 61.0244.0143.8 59.1 61.0280.0
WIL2 32.1 24.1 8.0 106.0 42.8 34.0 8.0 140.0
WIL3 38.8 28.9 . 11.0 140.0 49.5 37.1 11.0 160.0

















WILT .99 .99 .98 —.43 1.0
FEMALEJOBS
- .
WILl WIL2 WIL3 WIL4 WILT
WILl 1.0
W1L2 .99 1.0
WIL3 .95 .94 1.0
W1L4 —.07 —.09 —.11 1.0
UILT .99 .99 .97 —.05 1.0
Table 6

















Source: Authors' calculations from data in State of Wastdnt6n Comparabic Worth
Study PhaseTwo. December 1976 (Norman I). Willis & Associates • Decenber
1976)•andprivate correspondence from Dr. Helen Itemick(2/3/64)indicating
which occupations were male (or female) dominated.Table 7
Eatinted Coparab1e WorthMinimumSalary Equations; Washington Data





11l coefficients in log salary equations have been multiplied by 100.
where; C —intercept
WILT —totalWillis points






(1) State of Washington. Coiparable Worth Study; Phase Two,Occesther1976 (Norman D. Willis and
Associates,Decetbar 1916).
(2)state of Washington. Department of Personnel, Compensation Plan (January 1, 1974).
(3) Privatc correspondence from Dr. Helen Rcmick (February 3. 1984).
Cl) (3) (4) (6)
I.og of Minimum Salary
(5)
Male Equations (rn.63)
443.33 (14.2)462.76 (4.7)447.01 (8.9)621.67 (151.0)620.92 (47.5)620.68 (93.8) C
WILT 1.57 (10.9) .193 (10.2)
WILl .91 (0.6) .152 (0.7)
WILl 7.29 (2.2) .761 (1.7)
1111.3 —2.05 (1.2) —.203(—O.9) .269 (0.7)
W1L4 2.80 (.93) 1.29 (0.4) .431 (1.1) .194 (9.2)
WILS 1.S7 (9.8)
a2 .662 .693 .662 .629 .651 .629
FemaleEquation(n53)
352.82 (16.1) 252.60 (3.6)370.46 (15.8)602.64 (198.4)582.36 (62.7)605.22 (187.0) C
WILT 1.26 (15.1) .177 (15.4)
WILl 3.32 (2.9) .576 (3.8)
WIL2 —1.37 (0.8) —.338 (1.4)
W1L3 .33 (0.4) .003 (0.0)
111L4 —2.96 (2.0) —2.37 (1.2) —.469 (1.8) —.356 (1.3)
WILS 1.25 (15.4) .176 (15.7)
a2 .804 .826 .815 .809 .842 .821Table 8
Estimates of the Unweighted Mean Percentage "Comparable



























where the differentials at the minimum salary level are computed for each
female job class in method using the Willis Point Scores far the class
and the coefficients from the male wage equations in column jofTable 7.
Analogous computations are done for the maximum and midpoint salary levels
using coefficients from male maximum and midpoint salary level equations
which are specified similarly to those in Table 7.
Correlation
Salary
of Comparable WorthCaps at the Minimum













.99Mean Mm. Max. Mean Max.
WILl 118.16 32.05 61.0 184.0 107.02 36.01 61.0 212.0
WIL2 32.37 17.60 8.0 70.0 26.29 17.78 8.0 92.0
W1L3 42.14 20.11 11.0 80.0 36.21 23.61 11.0 122.0
WIL4 8.19 6.03 0.0 17.0 4.07 5.87 0.0 17.0









































—shareof category .1 points
in total Willis points
Source: Authors' calculations from data in State of Connecticut Objective Job



























WILL + W1L2 + V1L3
Sotirce of data: State of Connecticut Objective Job Evaluation Pilot Study (Nor,nan P. Willis and Associates.
February 1980).
LogQrithmof Salary
(5) (1) (3) (4) (6)
l4sle Equations(n—43)
7892.191 (9.8)7915.740(5.1)9370.069(12.0)910.953(169.9)909.185(89.5)920.772(177.3) C
WILT 32.916 (8.6) .226 (8.9)
WILl 58.011(2.4) .427 (2.7)
W1L2 22.515(0.4) .051 (0.2)
1111.3 —2.513(0.1) .028 (0.1)
1111.4 —108.585(2.7)—116.299 (3.1) —.736 (2.8) —.764 (3.1)
WILS 31.590 (9.7) .217 (10.0)





WILl 34.716(1.8) .369 (2.3)
WIL2 34.403(0.6) .105 (0.2)
W1L3 2.142(0.1) .001 (0.0)
WIL4 28.755(1.0)28.938 (1.0) .195 (0.8) .191 (0.8)
was . 24.756(11.4) .197 (10.5)
i2 .769 .756 .765 .738 .731 .733
'All coefficients iii the log salary equations have been aultiplied by 100. The salary
Step4 ofthe applicable salary ranges.
figures are forTable 11
Estimates of Percentage "Comparable Worth Cap"
for Connecticut Data: Alternative Estimation Methods
15 B6























where the differentials are computed for each female job class using the
Nay Point scores for the class and the coefficients from the male wage
equations in Table 10.
uses equation j for j —1to 6Table 12
Determinants of Relative Occupational Nobility Over
the 1965—1970 Period for SW Employees in New York State
(absolute value of tstatistic)
LR1
(1) (2)
C .476 (11.9) .488 (12.1)
STATE —.013 (3.0) —.013 (2.9)
ACE —.003 (2.1) —.003 (2.2)
ACE2 .002 (1.6) .003 (1.7)




SEX —.019(4.8) —.020 (4.7)
i2 .044 .047
4944 for all equations
AGE2coefficientshave been multiplied by 100.
where C —intercepttent
STATE —1—stateemployee, 0 =localgovernment employee
ACE —individual'sage
ACE2 —agesquared
11165 —logarithmof mean earnings of SLC employees in New York
State in 1969 inthe individual's 1965 3—digit occupation
WORK1 —1work 27—39 weeks in 1969, 0 —other
WORK2—1—work40—47 weeks in 1969. 0 =otheromittedcategory is
work 50—52 weeks in
WORK3 —1nwork48—49 weeks in 1969, 0 =other )1969
SEX —1female, 0male
LR1—logarithmof the ratioofmean earnincsof SLC employeesin New
York State in1969in the Individual's 1970 3—digitoccupation
tomean earnings of SLG employees itt1969in the individual's
1965 3—digit occupation
Source: Authors' calculations from data from the 1/100 sample for New
YorkState of the 1970 Census of Pqjdation. Tue analyses are
confined to individuals ages 20 to 70 i 1970. who were SW
employees in both years, and who worked at least 27 weeksin1969.
Ofthis group, roughly 16 percentchanged3—digit occupations
between1965and 1970, so in 84 percent of the cases LRI takes
on the value of zero.Table 13
Male/Foal. PublicA4inistrationRelative Employnent Euations
1970 aud 1980 Census of Population —SMSALevel Data
(absolsat. value of t statistic)
1970& 1980
1980 Data 1970 Data Data
LRZ8OI 11E802 LRE7OI LRE703 1fl704 ALREI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












LELSO .646 (1.8) .811 (3.1)
IaL7O .853 (2.8) 1.260 (3.4) .278 (0.7)
ALRL .234 (0.5)
K2. .107 .170 .149 .135 .083 .021
ii lAB 148 118 118 118 118
vbere:
UK44
—logarithnof theratioof male to feiale public administration employees in the SMSA
—80(1980) or70 (1970)
—I—allpublicadoinistrationemployees
2—full—year public administration employees
3—Allfederalpublic administration employees
4— all state and local public administration employees
LRWJI —logarithmoftheratioof male public administration employees' median earnings to femalepublic
administrationemployees' median earnings
-
— 1ogarithiof total public ad,.inistration employmentinthe SM$A
LRL1
—logarithmof the ratio of the male tofemale laborforce in the SMSA
6— 1980 valueof the variable m4nus 1970valueoC the variable
a(b) When estimation was restrictedto the sample of 118 SMSA's that were present in the 1970 data.
the LRWSOI (LBW802)coefficient fell to.634 (.600)with a tstatistic of 1.8 (1.7).
Source: Author's calculations from data in:
1) iaoCensusof Population: Detailed Populflion Clmracteritstlcs (individual state volumes,
tables 120, 231);
2)1972 City andCounty Data Book trable 3);











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimates of Own Wage Elasticities of Demand for State and Local
Government Enployees by Occupation
(mean share of payroll)
Professionalet al. —.207 (.731) —.633(.453) (.820) —.791(.280)
Technicaletal. —.880 (.147) —.276(.267) —.961(.068) .961(.205)
Service 1.593*(.080) .303(.152)—1.191(.078) .750(.301)
Other .850 (.042) .050(.12b) .005(.034) —.757(.214)
Derived from own wage coefficients in Tables 16 and 17 (homogeneity and symmetry
constrained specifications), mean share of payroll pent on the category, and
equation (7) in the text.





Implied Percentage Effects of a 20 Percent CWWAForAll Females on the
Employmentof Females in State and Local Governments
Due toOccupational Substitution; Total
Employment Budget Held Constant





Professional —6.2 —8.7 —15.6 —12.5
Technical & Support —4.9 —6.8 21.5 —3.9
Service —6.0 2.8 14.4 —2.2
Other —7.4 2.6 10.4 5.5
Overall —5.9 —5.5 —5.9 —5.4
a)Minimum Change




—9.3 —7.1 —12.1 —11.9
Source: Authors' calculations using the method described in the Appendix,
thecoefficients from the homogeneity and symmetry constrained
regressionsreported in Tables 16 and 17 and the underlying
Census -data.Appendix Table 1
P tests to Test Alternative Functional Forms
for the Male Equations in Various State Data Sets
Salary Equations Log Salary Equations
Sample (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Connecticut 4.32* 11.97* 0.68 4.42* 11.96* 0.89
-
Minnesota 2.23 0.00 3•3Ø* 6.57* 0.66 9•5Q*
Washington (Mm.) 1.83 0.01 2.70 1.21 0.05 1.76
Washington (flax.) 2.63 1.46 3.23* 1.30 0.77 1.56
Washington (Ave.) 2.24 0.62 3.02 1.32 0.21 1.84
*Reject the null hypothesis (Ho) in favor of the alternative hypothesis (Ha)
at the .05 level of significance.
Le DV be the dependent variable and UP represent either Hay or Willis points.
Remembering that EPTHPI + 1122 + 1123 + 1124 and 1125 1121 + 1122 + 1123, the
equation estimated in each case is
DV + a1RP1 + a2HP2 + a3HP3 + a41124. Then
(1)Ro:a182a3a4 Ua:no constraints on a1, a2, a3, 84
(2)Ro:a182 —a3 a4 Ha:a1a2 —a3,a4 free to vary
(3)Ho:a1 =a2a3 Ha;no constraints on a1, a2, a3, a4